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S
ince the adoption of the 1995 Data Protection 
Directive (Directive)1 in the European Union, 
data sharing between Europe and the United 
States has been problematic. The Directive 
made concrete in law and policy a conception 
of privacy that had been diverging from its US 
counterpart for decades. Nevertheless, in the first 
decade of the 21st Century, a “safe harbor” and 
related agreements (together, Safe Harbor)2 stitched 
together a peace. Though at times the peace rested 
uneasily, it bridged the Atlantic sufficiently to allow 
commerce and innovation in technology and infor-
mation to flourish largely unhindered by restrictions 
on international data transfers.
But in the 2010s, the gulf between the conti-
nents has widened, and the bridge is stressed to a 
possible breaking point. The Snowden revelations 
of US government surveillance have exacerbated 
tensions. Meanwhile ambitious efforts to over-
haul the Directive for the new era of intercon-
nected electronics and invasive technology has 
proven contentious both within Europe and abroad. 
Continued on page 15
Transnational business now watches intently as behe-
moth political powers struggle to refashion world pri-
vacy policy with far-reaching implications for human 
rights and economic liberty around the world.
This article analyzes the differing perspectives 
that animate US and EU conceptions of privacy in the 
context of data protection. It begins by briefly review-
ing the two continental approaches to data protection 
and then explains how the two approaches arise in a 
context of disparate cultural traditions with respect to 
the role of law in society. In light of those disparities, 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2637010 
J u l y  2 0 1 5  J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N E T  L A W
15
the final discussion focuses on points of disparity that 
are unlikely to be overcome in short-term negotiations 
and advises each side on moving forward.
TWO VANTAGES
International politics and economics being what 
they are, privacy law and policy in the United States 
and Europe reverberate throughout the world. To be 
sure, US and European conceptions of privacy emerge 
in a Western legal tradition that is far from universal. 
Viewed from a truly global cultural perspective, the 
trans-Atlantic divergence is not so broad. But US and 
EU approaches today vie not only for north Atlantic 
dominance, but as models for the world. So the study 
of this divergence, and how it emerged from a shared 
cultural heritage, merits scrutiny.
COMMON FONT
Underpinning contemporary data protection regu-
lation is the normative value that both US and EU 
societies place on personal privacy. Both cultures attri-
bute modern privacy to the famous Warren-Brandeis 
article in 1890, outlining a “right to be let alone.”3 But 
decades passed before the impact of the article was felt. 
Notwithstanding the dramatic achievement of wom-
en’s suffrage, human rights in the early 20th Century 
were marred by the two World Wars and failure of the 
League of Nations. After World War II, privacy came 
into its own. The word appeared explicitly in Article 
12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,4 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1948. With the 
drafting in 1950 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR),5 however, the United States 
and Europe committed to divergent paths.
PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION 
IN EUROPE
Both privacy and data protection are today 
part of the fundamental rights system of Europe, 
a component of the amalgamated constitution of 
the European Union. Both are part of the legisla-
tive and regulatory state at the national and federal 
levels. This remarkable ubiquity of privacy and data 
protection in European law has come into being sub-
stantially in just the last half century.
Constitutional Law
Privacy is safeguarded by ECHR Article 8, mod-
eled in its 1950 original after the 1948 Universal 
Declaration. The right appears in the dichotomous 
expression typical of modern human rights guaran-
tees, one provision broadly articulating the right, 
followed by a second provision that authorizes public 
limitation when “necessary in a democratic society.” 
Whereas the Fourth Amendment in the United 
States is a negative assertion designed to curtail state 
power from infringement of individual liberty—
referencing a right that “shall not be violated”—the 
European right of privacy is a positive declaration.
By the 1970s, the ECHR was showing its age. 
To meet the challenges of the nascent information 
age, the Council of Europe in 1980 adopted the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,6 
known as “Convention 108” after its catalog number 
in the European Treaty Series. Convention 108 intro-
duced the notion of balance in the data protection 
context, “[r]ecognising that it is necessary to recon-
cile the fundamental values of the respect for privacy 
and the free flow of information between peoples.”7 
The convention furthermore singled out “privacy” 
as a “particular” motivation among its human-rights 
aims,8 and the term appears three times in the con-
vention’s substantive provisions.9
The right to privacy was folded into Article 7 
of the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, (Charter)10 made binding on the 
European Union through the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon,11 
effective 2009. The Charter does not expressly limit 
rights by public necessity in the old dichotomous 
style, but incorporates permissible limitations in 
national law by reference to the source rights and 
responsibilities as articulated in the ECHR.12
Critically, the Charter in its Article 8 
“recognize[d] the right to the protection of personal 
data as a new fundamental right, distinct from the 
[article 7] right to respect for private and family 
life, home and communications.”13 Accordingly the 
European Commission regards data protection as a 
member of the “third generation” of fundamental 
rights alongside governmental transparency and “bio-
ethics guarantees,” the latter also privacy inspired.14 
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Article 8 has three provisions. The first broadly pro-
claims “the right to the protection of personal data.” 
The second provision concerns data processing. First 
it requires that “data … be processed fairly for speci-
fied purposes and on the basis of the consent of the 
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law.” Second it proclaims a right of access 
to data and a right to rectification of error. The third 
provision requires that data protection compliance 
be controlled by “an independent authority,” that is, 
by an entity at arm’s length from the conventional 
machinery of each national government.
Law and Regulation
Those particular data protection concepts 
enshrined in the 2000 Charter—limited and consen-
sual processing, access and rectification, and supervi-
sory independence—were by then known principles 
of the European data protection regime—established 
by the 1995 Directive.15
The Directive has been well summarized in the 
literature.16 It is broad in scope. The “personal data” 
that triggers regulation is “any information relating 
to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly,” even by a reference 
number or descriptive characteristic.17 Data “process-
ing” is “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data,” including collection, 
transmission, and destruction.18 Regulated data “con-
trollers” and “processors” include any persons or enti-
ties responsible for data processing, public or private.19
Any data processing must be “legitimate,” and 
legitimacy is dictated by disjunctive criteria, which 
include subject consent, legal obligation, vital inter-
ests of the subject, public interest, and “legitimate 
interests” not contravened by fundamental rights.20 In 
broad strokes, the Directive articulated a series of fair 
information practices (FIPs) that have become well 
recognized norms, namely: 
• “data minimization,”21 meaning that data con-
trollers should collect and retain data only as 
befits the purpose of its use;22
• notice, access, and correction: all provisions in 
the later vein of Charter article 8(2), regarding 
the obligation of data controllers to inform data 
subjects about the collection and processing 
of their data, affording opportunity for access 
to that data and correction, or rectification, of 
errors;23
• transparency of data processing,24 especially with 
regard to the logic behind automated data pro-
cessing, a safeguard that means in part to forestall 
de facto discrimination resulting from the use of 
analytics;25 
• consent of data subjects to the processing of their 
data, “freely given[,] specific[,] and informed”;26
• “sensitive data”27 classifications, such as medical 
and financial, and that trigger a higher level of 
protection;28
• security, to protect data against misuse, loss, and 
theft;29
• enforcement of data protection law through 
national supervisory bodies;30 and
• independence of the national supervisory 
bodies.31
As a “directive” in European law, the data pro-
tection law must be implemented at the national 
level. As a piece of federal legislation, the Directive 
is subject to definitive interpretation by the European 
Court of Justice. Furthermore, the Directive in its 
article 29 constitutes a “Working Party,” comprising 
national data protection supervisors and representa-
tives of European Community bodies and of the 
European Commission.
The Directive contains a number of impor-
tant limitations. Data processing limitations pertain 
only within the scope of European Community law, 
though data transfers onward to third countries are 
permissible only if “adequate” data safeguards are in 
place on the receiving end.32 The Directive exempts 
from its scope state data processing for purposes of 
national security and criminal law enforcement.33 
“[A] natural person in the course of a purely personal 
or household activity” also is exempt.34
Proposed Regulation
Now 20 years old, the Directive is dated. The 
Internet was far from ubiquitous in 1995, and mass 
data processing was the occupation of a manageable 
range of public and private actors. Technological 
advancements have brought daily life within the 
ambit of the Directive, and globalization in commerce 
has tested the reach of the Directive. Meanwhile the 
passage of time has resulted in increasing variegation 
in the interpretation, application, and enforcement of 
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data protection across Europe. The sum of these pres-
sures was a movement in the European Parliament 
to overhaul and supersede the Directive with a 
new General Data Protection Regulation (Proposed 
Regulation).
The European Commission published a draft 
text for the Proposed Regulation in January 2012.35 
The ambitious project has spurred quarrels within 
Europe—even a competing draft from the European 
Parliament36—and drawn fire from abroad, namely 
media and business interests in the United States. 
At the time of this writing in spring 2015, adoption 
seems more likely in 2016 than in 2015, with an effec-
tive date two or three years later.
The Proposed Regulation also has been explicated 
in the literature.37 As a regulation rather than a direc-
tive, it will be a self-executing law among EU member 
states, not contingent on the enactment of domestic 
legislation. In short, the Proposed Regulation will 
beef up fair information practices. Consent standards 
are more demanding, transparency requirements are 
more explicit, and liability and sanctions for non-
compliance are more severe. Supervision and enforce-
ment are toughened, and consistency enhanced, with 
the creation of a European Data Protection Board, 
composed of national data protection supervisors.
Critically, the Proposed Regulation extends its 
territorial reach outside the European Community, 
to any entity within the reach of EU jurisdiction 
that “offers goods or services to … data subjects in the 
Union” or “monitors their behavior.”38 The Proposed 
Regulation thus sweeps in the lot of multinational 
companies that do business with EU citizens, regard-
less of a company’s geographic location. That expan-
sion is what has drawn the attention, and in some 
cases the ire, of US interests.
PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION 
IN THE UNITED STATES
It comes as a surprise to the casual observer of 
US law that there is in the United States any kind 
of systematic protection for data privacy. Indeed, 
“systematic” is a generous word. But Warren-Brandeis 
privacy did originate in the United States, and the 
Internet era has seen a burgeoning complex of law 
and regulation in privacy, however much lacking in 
unifying strategy.
Constitutional Law 
The lack of explicit mention of privacy in the US 
Bill of Rights has slowed but not stopped the develop-
ment of privacy as a constitutional concept. But two 
features of US constitutional design—federalism and 
negative civil rights—have important implications 
for how privacy is and may be developed in US law.
First, the US Constitution created a rigid federal 
structure, bolstered by the Tenth Amendment and 
limited by the Reconstruction Amendments. The 
observance of vertical separation of powers has been 
a hallmark of the conservative political platform and 
conservative constitutional jurisprudence since the 
civil rights era—witness the debate over universal 
healthcare in federal law. As a result, the federal gov-
ernment must navigate the complexities of its limited 
powers to erect a nationwide level floor of statutory 
and regulatory privacy protection.
Second, the Bill of Rights, as incorporated 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, is a negative 
legal instrument, designed to shield people against 
the power of government.39 As a result, US consti-
tutional privacy law is powerfully influenced by the 
state action doctrine. Constitutional manifestations 
of privacy in the United States are not well equipped 
to frame a modern system of data protection that 
tackles challenges in the public and private sectors 
alike.
At least when state action is implicated, privacy 
has manifested as a constitutional value in three 
dimensions: (1) the right to personal autonomy, (2) the 
right to be let alone, and (3) the right to informa-
tional privacy.
The first vein of constitutional privacy, personal 
autonomy, comes closest to the broad European con-
ception of privacy as a basic dignitary interest. This 
is the right of privacy that operates in the abortion 
cases, in essence affording a woman pre-viability 
access to abortion services subject to state constraints 
that do not unduly burden the right.40 Consequently, 
autonomy-privacy has been swept up in the vitriol of 
the abortion controversy. The bitter political, social, 
and jurisprudential divides cast a long shadow over 
every discussion of privacy as a constitutional con-
cept. Autonomy-privacy is not so limited, though, 
and has a broad range of potential application, espe-
cially in medical decisionmaking. Autonomy-privacy 
has been at stake in the US Supreme Court’s “right 
to die” cases, one finding a constitutional right to 
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refuse unwanted treatment,41 and another rejecting a 
constitutional right to assisted suicide.42
The second vein of constitutional privacy, the right 
to be let alone, or to seclusion, traces its lineage directly 
to the 1791 Bill of Rights. In Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence, the controlling concept in defining the scope 
of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures 
has been the “reasonable expectation of privacy.”43 
This test is criticized today as incompatible with a 
fundamental, so undiminishable, right.44 Reasonable 
expectation, a floating norm, necessarily diminishes 
in the panopticon of the online world.45 Making mat-
ters worse, the reasonable expectation of privacy is 
limited dramatically by the third-party doctrine, which 
holds that privacy is forfeit when information is vol-
untarily submitted to a third party, such as a bank or 
communication service provider.46 This stark division 
between information secret because it is secreted, and 
information not secret because it is disclosed—termed 
“the secrecy paradigm” by Professor Daniel Solove47—
persists as a norm in US privacy law. But what might 
at one time have accorded with a societal sense of rea-
sonableness no longer does—as evidenced by popular 
objection to the dragnet collection of communication 
metadata by the US intelligence service.
The third vein of constitutional privacy, the right 
to informational privacy, has been assumed arguendo 
by the US Supreme Court on three occasions, but 
remains a largely uncharted sea. In all three cases, the 
Court concluded that public access to personal infor-
mation was sufficiently justified or constrained to 
surmount the objections of data subjects. In Whalen v. 
Roe,48 the Court rejected a challenge, based on 
informational privacy and autonomy-privacy, to a 
New York criminal enforcement system that moni-
tored drug prescriptions. In Nixon v. Administrator 
of General Services,49 the Court determined that the 
statutory-regulatory framework for reviewing and 
preserving executive records adequately protected the 
informational privacy interests of former President 
Nixon. More recently, in NASA v. Nelson,50 the 
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to security 
background checks on space-agency contractors.
Statute and Common Law
While lacking a comprehensive privacy law, 
the US Congress has enacted a number of sector-
specific privacy laws, usually using the Commerce 
Clause51 as the source of federal legislative authority. 
These statutes include the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA) (1970),52 the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA) (1974),53 the federal Privacy 
Act (1974),54 the Video Privacy Protection Act 
(VPPA) (1988),55 the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (1996),56 and the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) 
(1998).57
Each law defines its own scope in accordance 
with the problem it anticipates, and each its over-
sight or enforcement mechanism, invariably public 
rather than private. For example, FERPA governs 
public and private educational institutions receiving 
public funds (virtually all of them) with respect to 
student data, and HIPAA governs defined health-
care providers with respect to patient data. FERPA 
is enforced by the Department of Education58 with 
regulated entities’ funding in jeopardy (though no 
de-funding has ever occurred).59 HIPAA is enforced 
by the Department of Health and Human Services60 
and threatens heavy civil fines as well as criminal 
jeopardy.61 Neither authorizes private enforcement.
More recently, strident legal means of data pro-
tection have emerged in three more venues: (1) data 
breach notification laws, (2) consumer protection 
law, and (3) common law tort. Forty-seven states, 
Washington, DC, and three territories now have data 
breach notification laws.62 They vary widely in their 
particulars; 14 states, Washington, DC, Puerto Rico, 
and the US Virgin Islands authorize a private cause 
of action.63 A key law exists too at the federal level, 
limited to the finance sector: the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, formally known as the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999.64 As hacking and data 
breaches continue to make headlines, the adoption of 
a cross-sector federal law seems inevitable.65
Second, data protection has emerged in con-
sumer protection law. Born with the US regula-
tory state in the early 20th Century, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) has characteristically broad 
authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act to regulate 
“unfair methods of competition in or affecting com-
merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
or affecting commerce.”66 Accordingly, the FTC has 
deployed its authority in furtherance of the simple 
proposition that a company must do what it says it 
does. So if a company says that it maintains data 
security, that statement becomes a promise to the 
consumer, enforceable by the FTC. The scope of 
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that enforcement authority is now being tested in 
the Third Circuit.67 Target of an FTC enforcement 
suit, Wyndham Worldwide Corp., a global hotelier, 
is arguing that the FTC lacks statutory authority to 
bind commercial entities to reasonable data security 
standards.68
A third and very recent avenue of data protection 
is now emerging in common law tort. Despite the lack 
of a private cause of action in sector-specific privacy 
statutes, some victims of data security breaches have 
found traction in common law negligence, predicated 
on the violation of privacy law.69 A negligence per se 
theory fits well with HIPAA-designed classes of plain-
tiff, hazard, and harm, and the Connecticut Supreme 
Court found HIPAA not preemptive.70
Proposed Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act
In late February 2015, the White House pub-
lished a discussion draft of a bill, the Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights Act (CPBRA).71 The draft 
drew together ideas that had been fomenting for 
some time. Consumer bills of rights already have been 
floated on Capitol Hill, and the White House lan-
guage closely tracks ideas published two years earlier 
in an executive white paper.72 Politics being what it 
is in Washington in the last two years of the Obama 
Administration, the CPBRA probably will not get 
traction in this Congress. But with keen bipartisan 
interest in consumer protection, and even the sup-
port of industry seeking to reduce costs through har-
monization in domestic and international regulatory 
compliance, the CPBRA might prove influential in 
the eventual development of cross-sector privacy 
legislation in the United States.
The CPBRA would maintain federal focus on 
consumer privacy in commercial transactions, so the 
law is not cross-sectoral in every respect. The hook 
for federal jurisdiction is the Commerce Clause.73 
Enforcement authority remains with the FTC and 
exclusively public,74 though state attorneys gen-
eral are authorized to bring enforcement actions in 
the absence of FTC action.75 Protected informa-
tion relates to consumer identity, including names, 
financial account identifiers, and communication 
identifiers, such as an online user’s Internet Protocol 
address.76 The CPBRA broadly defines “covered 
entities” by excluding governments, individuals act-
ing non-commercially, and small businesses—data 
processing from fewer than 10,000 individuals or 
devices per 12 months, or employing fewer than six 
persons, except where sensitive data are concerned.77 
Substantial civil penalties attend violation of data 
protection standards, up to $35,000 per day, or $5,000 
per consumer, to a maximum of $25 million.78
The CPBRA drives its FIPs with 11 “context” 
factors, including the scope of the regulated entity’s 
interaction with the data subject, the nature of the 
regulated entity’s business in goods or services, fore-
seeability and customary business practices, the age 
and sophistication of the data subject, and security 
measures employed by the regulated entity.79 The FIPs 
themselves include:
• data minimization in collection, retention, and 
use;80
• notice requirements;81
• reasonable control over data in proportion to the 
risks in event of compromise;82
• reasonable use of data in light of context;83
• revocable consent;84
• reasonable access, correction or destruction, 
and accuracy;85
• deletion, destruction, or de-identification of 
data upon expiry of the processor’s purpose;86 and
• reasonable security and accountability measures 
to protect data.87
Data processing that is “not reasonable” still may be 
permitted if a regulated entity conducts an appropri-
ate privacy risk analysis,88 and a regulated entity may 
apply to the FTC for pre-approval of a code of prac-
tice as a safe harbor.89
The correction and accuracy provisions exempt 
information obtained from government sources, so 
providing a sort of fair-reporting privilege.90 Also 
the CPBRA defers repeatedly—in a global provision 
and in specific limitations on duties—to the First 
Amendment rights of regulated entities.91 That latter 
qualification might cut deeply into the obligations 
the law would impose, insofar as a commercial entity 
has a First Amendment right to republish lawfully 
obtained truthful information.92
Reaction to the White House draft was swift 
and critical from both sides (perhaps a good sign). A 
representative of a consumer-protection organization 
declared the bill too “full of loopholes” to afford con-
sumers “meaningful control of their data.”93 Rep. Ed 
Markey (D-MA) called for a statutory reform offering 
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“uniform and legally enforceable rules” rather than 
flexible factors.94 At the same time, an advocate for 
the advertising industry criticized the draft bill as “an 
attempt to prevent theoretical harms,” “sure to put a 
deep chill” on information innovation.95
THE POND BETWIXT
TECTONIC DIFFERENTIAL
Obviously substantial differences separate EU 
and US privacy law.96 The former is comprehensive, 
the latter sectoral. Differences derive from a dispar-
ity between each continent’s foundational thinking 
about law and society, especially with respect to civil 
rights. And the differences play out in each conti-
nent’s capacity and willingness to legislate in privacy 
and data protection.97
Europe embraces a social-democratic form of 
government. Fundamental rights are dynamic and 
evolving. Government has an affirmative duty to the 
public to foster this evolution through the positive 
operation of law, bolstering and expanding individual 
autonomy. Law advances policy choices that are 
distributive, or allocative, of societal resources, in 
accordance with the normative choices of democratic 
bodies. Individuals owe a duty to one another in an 
interdependent system of social responsibility.
The United States embraces a libertarian model 
of government. Fundamental rights derive from a 
relatively static Constitution. Rights may be adapted 
through interpretive jurisprudence, if not through 
strict originalism and textual amendment, but liv-
ing constitutionalism or re-constitutionalism is dis-
favored. Government is best that governs least, so 
the operation of law is largely negative, to ensure 
that social and economic liberties are protected from 
interference. Law functions primarily in a corrective 
capacity, reacting to wrongs by re-leveling the play-
ing field. Individual autonomy flourishes on liberty, 
rendering persons responsible for their own choices, 
whether successful or unsuccessful.
The EU approach to data protection is compre-
hensive, or omnibus. The Data Protection Directive 
spans strata of geography, society, and subject matter; 
the Proposed Regulation will only deepen continen-
tal commitment to the confederal system. The system 
draws its authority initially from fundamental rights 
as articulated in international human rights instru-
ments and constituting documents. That higher 
law is then given effect through supranational and 
national legislation and administrative regulation. 
Enforcement occurs at all levels from supranational 
courts to national courts to administrative process. 
Individuals are entitled to seek redress.
The US approach to data protection is sectoral, 
or ad hoc. Sectoral vectors vary and include dual 
sovereignty, geographic jurisdiction, scope of regu-
lated industry, and data subject matter. The system 
has a limited constitutional foundation, especially as 
against regulated entities in the private sector, and 
draws its authority principally from sectoral statutes 
and their regulations. These laws favor paradigms 
of property and contract, rather than human rights. 
The statutory framework may be complemented by 
evolving common law. Enforcement varies with the 
sectoral scope of the legal device. But enforcement 
is largely a public undertaking with limited if any 
redress for individuals.
Macro differences in approach play out in count-
less ways in the micro systems of data protection. The 
United States obsession with economic liberty explains 
the persistent focus on commercial relationships from 
2000 Safe Harbor to the 2015 Consumer Privacy Bill of 
Rights Act. Relationships among persons and commer-
cial actors in the United States are matters of contract 
and property. The secrecy paradigm arises from the 
notion of personal data as property. At common law, a 
person has no persistent legal interest in property that 
is sold or given away. Moreover, a constitutional right 
of republication weighs heavily against regulation of 
information disclosure or transfer. Public actors can 
be regulated only by the negative operation of con-
stitutional or statutory law. A data processor operates 
on a presumption of permissibility, subject to highly 
constrained limitations.
In contrast, Europe’s romantic attraction to funda-
mental rights frames data protection in a rights para-
digm. Personal dignity and autonomy are dictated by 
how information presents one’s identity to the world. 
Accordingly, a person’s legal interests persist in infor-
mation as it flows downstream from one pair of hands 
to the next. The individual retains rights to direct and 
control the use of that information, and even to recall it 
from the marketplace. Positive articulations of human 
rights imbue government not only with the power to 
protect those persistent legal rights in information, 
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but a duty to effect informational rights as against the 
interests of other actors. Informational rights moreover 
must be balanced with, and do not yield to, competing 
rights, such as freedom of expression in republication. 
Public and private actors alike are bound by the posi-
tive operation of law to advance fundamental rights. A 
data processor operates only with legal authorization, 
against a background of presumed prohibition.
SAFE HARBOR AND STORMY WEATHER
The patchwork of data protection law in the 
United States is far from “adequate” to ensure data 
protection to the standards of the EU Directive. 
Accordingly, the European Union and United States 
negotiated a fix in the 2000 Safe Harbor Agreement.98 
To ensure the integrity of data transferred from 
Directive nations onward to the United States, 
receiving entities could pledge their allegiance to an 
agreed on series of principles, including:
• clear notice of data collection, processing, and 
transfer; 
• data subject choice to opt out (or to opt in when 
sensitive information is concerned); 
• subsequent data transfer limited by comparable 
safeguards; 
• reasonable security to protect data; 
• relevance of data processing to purpose of 
collection;
• data subject access to correct, amend, or delete 
data, subject to proportionality of the burden on 
another’s rights;
• enforcement through complaint, dispute resolu-
tion process, and sufficient sanction.99
The mechanism to give force of law to the Safe 
Harbor Agreement is the broad authority of FTC Act 
Section 5.100 A commercial actor must self-certify its 
compliance to the FTC, and contravention of that 
representation constitutes an unfair or deceptive 
trade practice.101
Safe Harbor was complemented, if not out-
stripped, by two other mechanisms for Directive 
compliance in the United States, model contractual 
clauses and binding corporate rules. The European 
Commission approved model contractual clauses in 
2001 and 2004.102 A party in Europe is able to effect 
a Directive-sanctioned data transfer with a party in 
the United States by including approved language in 
a contract governing the transfer.103 The Article 29 
Working Party has approved binding corporate rules 
in various versions.104 A multinational corporation 
may adopt binding corporate rules to effect Directive-
sanctioned data transfers between EU and US business 
components bound by the same rules.105 Binding cor-
porate rules receive explicit sanction in the Proposed 
Regulation.106 Model contractual clauses and bind-
ing corporate rules both are made enforceable in the 
United States through the FTC Act.
Safe Harbor has not been a cure-all. The United 
States and Europe tussled for years over the US secu-
rity demand that incoming airliners surrender pas-
senger manifests.107 But Safe Harbor maintained an 
uneasy peace for more than a decade. Then European 
efforts to update data protection law propelled Safe 
Harbor into renegotiation in 2011.108 That negotia-
tion was shocked in 2013 by the Snowden revelations 
of US surveillance practices, causing the European 
Parliament and national political leaders to scrutinize 
the renegotiation and raise objections to its singular 
focus on the private sector.109
Nevertheless, negotiators in 2014 announced sub-
stantial agreement on revamping Safe Harbor, even 
while European squabbles persist internally over the 
Proposed Regulation. Safe Harbor is expected to con-
tinue without dramatic change, i.e., without requiring a 
US consumer privacy bill of rights, or more—save one 
sticking point. EU leaders desire an individual right 
of EU citizens to judicial redress in the United States 
for violations of Safe Harbor commitments, analogous 
to the right of any person in the European Union dis-
satisfied with an outcome in a national data protection 
authority to take the case to court in that nation.110 
The 2000 agreement had solved the enforcement prob-
lem with an administrative dispute resolution process 
only within the FTC. A private cause of action in the 
third branch of government would introduce a horse of 
a different color, no less for EU complainants than for 
the domestic aggrieved. Even the White House’s draft 
CPBRA stops short of private enforcement.
BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATER
The competing Atlantic perspectives on data 
protection must be reconciled to a functional extent. 
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The difference between the two sides, from a global 
perspective, is too small to countenance an artificial, 
legal blockage of the naturally and rapidly increasing 
fluidity of global exchange in commerce, informa-
tion, and ideas. In previous writing, I posited that 
the two systems of privacy and data protection are 
farther along on a road to convergence than conven-
tional wisdom suggests.111 But the systems will not 
harmonize in just the next few years. Some fix of Safe 
Harbor is needed that both sides can abide.112
Following are salient points of difference over 
data protection that derive from the disparity in legal 
cultures across the Atlantic. On these points, wisdom 
counsels agreement to disagree. But the continua-
tion of Safe Harbor requires that these disparities be 
bridged at least temporarily while the slow but inexo-
rable process of cultural convergence marches on.
US STATE ACTION DOCTRINE VERSUS 
EU PUBLIC/PRIVATE REGULATION
The state action doctrine and negative operation 
of the Bill of Rights in the United States continue to 
mark a bright line in regulation between public and 
private regulated entities. In the European Union, 
public and private actors merge as regulated entities 
under the same data protection rules. The indepen-
dence principle requires national data protection 
authorities to work at arm’s length from government 
precisely to ensure non-partisan oversight of the 
public sector. From a European vantage, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) is a comfortably non-
partisan overseer of the private sector. But Europe 
evinced frustration, especially after the Snowden 
revelations, that Department of Commerce authority 
in data transfer negotiation stopped short of public 
sector data management. From the outsider’s perspec-
tive, trusting the Department of Defense to protect 
personal privacy from public intrusion seems a case 
of the fox and the henhouse. Worse, this fox bears a 
sated grin from feasting on cross-border email.
The European perspective here has merit, but 
only to a point. The dichotomy of state action in the 
United States is anachronistic. From the perspec-
tive of a data subject, privacy is privacy; the secrecy 
paradigm has merit. The privacy of a library record 
or a prescription record does not turn on the identity 
of the snoop. Invasion of privacy injures personal 
dignity regardless of whether the invader carries 
official credentials. Moreover, the threat is not dis-
similar. The same analytics a retailer uses to generate 
a customized coupon for cold medicine may be used 
to track the spread of virus, or to interdict metham-
phetamine production. Moreover, the same data may 
be used in the private sector to effect invidious price 
discrimination113 or in the public sector to effect dis-
crimination in law enforcement.
So if data protection is the logical extension of 
privacy rights, the United States cannot justify bearing 
down on the private sector while handling the public 
sector with kid gloves. Barring application of the odd 
sectoral statute, such as the Privacy Protection Act 
of 1980, which protects journalists,114 government 
intelligence gathering and criminal investigation are 
limited principally by the Fourth Amendment. The 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” standard, along 
with its gaping non sequitur, the third-party doctrine, 
is far out of step with contemporary technology. 
For example, police are now employing “stingray” 
devices—formerly the province of the super-spy—to 
mass-capture cell phone data in search of a target. 
Also the National Security Administration (NSA), 
reasonably under present law, contends that the 
mass collection of cell phone and email metadata 
is permissible under the third-party doctrine. In a 
speech at Northeastern University Law School in 
March 2015, Kade Crawford of the Massachusetts 
ACLU called for legislative solutions.115 She pointed 
out that the Fourth Amendment merely offers a 
constitutional floor to protect civil liberties, and 
the judicial process is far too slow to respond to new 
technological threats while people’s liberty hangs in 
the balance. Americans should demand legislation 
to protect civil liberties above the floor, Crawford 
asserted.
Beyond law enforcement, the Privacy Act of 
1974 holds federal government agencies at least to 
standards that modestly resemble the contemporary 
fair information practices of Safe Harbor and the 
European Directive.116 But the Privacy Act is limited 
in scope and qualitatively far less stringent. It requires 
notice that record systems are maintained, but notice 
means only publication in the Federal Register.117 The 
Privacy Act prohibits disclosure without consent, but 
its host of exemptions falls shy of the purpose-driven 
constraints of the Directive.118 The Privacy Act 
affords data subjects rights of access and correction, 
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though not withdrawal or erasure,119 and the act vests 
rights only in citizens and permanent residents.120
But when European arguments turn to Snowden, 
they smack of disingenuity. The Directive itself 
exempts national security within Europe.121 The 
exemption sensibly accommodates national sover-
eignty in the confederal system and pays faint but 
apt allegiance to the concept of three pillars in 
European governance, distinguishing civil, criminal, 
and military affairs.122 Foreign intelligence gather-
ing and homeland security in the United States also 
are rightly distinguished from public record man-
agement. Moreover, it strains credulity to imagine 
that European security officials are not engaged in 
their own vigorous intelligence gathering. Der Spiegel 
reported that the NSA shared its questionably got-
ten gains with the German intelligence service.123 
My more erudite colleague Professor David Bender 
imagined an aid to German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel tapping her on the shoulder after a speech 
of US-aimed outrage to politely mention Germany’s 
reliance on the same methods.124 Whatever national 
security policy is or should be among the north 
Atlantic nations, the NSA’s most relevant sin might 
be simply getting caught with its hands in the cookie 
jar. The contemporary problem of the surveillance 
state is a problem, and an important one, but it lies 
well beyond the purview of data transfer policy.
Europe in the end will have to accept the pri-
macy of the public-private distinction in US law and 
policy. No matter how similar the threat to privacy in 
each sector, the United States is far from recognizing 
a merger of public and private for the purpose of data 
protection regulation. Matters of national security 
should be relegated, such as the Passenger Name 
Records Agreement, beyond safe harbor.
At the same time, the United States should 
look hard at the Privacy Act. Its dated standards, 
only modestly amended since 1974, hardly suffice 
to protect personal privacy in the information age. 
In demonstrating respect for the dignity of the indi-
vidual, government should set the example for private 
business, not trail behind. Even pending legislative 
action, the US executive has ample latitude in its 
oversight of federal record management to improve 
information practices with respect to personal pri-
vacy. Negotiation over data transfer is an opportunity 
to learn from comparativism and to improve effi-
ciency and responsiveness in the federal bureaucracy.
The United States also should look hard at the 
inadequacy of the Fourth Amendment to constrain 
criminal law enforcement. A bright line does not 
always separate domestic crime from terroristic threats 
to national security. But the line shines well enough 
sometimes, as where the federal preoccupation with 
drug crime is concerned. Rather than setting a poor 
example for the states, such as with national secu-
rity letters that exploit the third-party doctrine, the 
federal government should lead the way in raising 
the bar above the Fourth Amendment floor. Again, 
negotiation over data transfer offers an opportunity to 
learn from comparative example. And again, the US 
executive has room to maneuver short of legislation. 
Attorneys General have ample power to regulate, and 
have regulated, investigatory practices in federal law 
enforcement.
US DUAL SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS 
EU CONFEDERATION
Dual sovereignty under the US Constitution still 
places sharp limits on the power of the federal govern-
ment. Especially in the fluid world of contemporary 
commerce and communication, the brilliance of the 
50 state laboratories125 often is lost on foreign enti-
ties, public and private alike, when legal agreements 
and commercial practices have to adhere simultane-
ously to the more than 50 standards of US state and 
territorial governments. But the debated wisdom of 
continuing this arrangement is immaterial; for better 
and for worse, it is the constitutional design that will 
not soon change.
In the European Union, the Directive maintains 
a confederal separation of powers by vesting data 
protection authority at the national level.126 The 
Proposed Regulation will increase the role of the 
federal government in the creation of a European 
Data Protection Board, to enhance consistency across 
nations. But overall the Proposed Regulation main-
tains the confederal model of data protection author-
ity. Under the Treaty of Lisbon and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),127 
the Proposed Regulation, assuming adoption by the 
European Council, is within the shared competen-
cies of the European Union and member states,128 
so is consistent with the unique design of vertically 
separated powers in the European Union. The shared 
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competence authorizes both social and economic 
legislation, so there is no distinction in the Directive 
or the Proposed Regulation between commercial and 
non-commercial activity. The Directive reaches indi-
viduals, if through national data protection authori-
ties, without federalism objections.
Owing in large measure to US federalism, the US 
legal system is highly resistant to exported EU privacy 
norms, a source of frustration for EU policy-makers. 
In the US division of governmental competencies, 
direct federal power over state governments is nearly 
restricted to the carrot-and-stick approach. So for the 
federal government to regulate public sector data pro-
tection at the state level would require either a sub-
stantial infusion of money or a political willingness 
to highly rate data protection as prerequisite to some 
other pot of federal gold—unlikely. With respect to 
criminal law enforcement, there might be room for 
Congress to enforce the Fourth Amendment through 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, and the pos-
sibility should not be ruled out, especially where equal 
protection against discrimination is concerned. But 
the negative operation of the Fourth Amendment 
still presents an obstacle to positive legislation.
Insofar as data protection in the private sector is 
predicated on personal privacy, and privacy is under-
stood in the Warren-Brandeis vein, the states possess 
the broadest authority to regulate. Accordingly, inva-
sion of privacy has developed in state tort law. Even 
the quasi-intellectual property theory of post mortem 
misappropriation of likeness has been a creation of 
state statute.129 Absent recognizable civil rights viola-
tion, federal action in the sphere of tort, contract, or 
property runs against the constitutional grain.
If anything like European shared competence over 
data protection is to be found in the United States, 
it is in the regulation of commerce. The broad reach 
of the Commerce Clause130—essentially “substantial 
effect” doctrine131 plus the Wickard multiplier132—
allows the federal hand to reach into what otherwise 
seems to be intrastate commerce. Meanwhile the 
states have principal regulatory authority over com-
merce within their borders. As nearly any commercial 
activity can be said to affect interstate commerce in 
today’s interconnected world, a broad gray zone of 
concurrent competence lies between the hypotheti-
cally purely household activity, on the one side, and 
federal preemption133 and the dormant Commerce 
Clause,134 on the other. It is no surprise, then, that 
state experimentation gave rise to the wave of data 
breach notification laws, inventing a concept that 
Europe itself has borrowed.135 Compliance with 47 
such laws might vex corporate counsel, but the 
advent of breach notification laws evidences the state 
laboratories working as they should.
US federal competence in data transfer negotia-
tion therefore necessarily is limited and finds its most 
robust expression in the commercial area. Following 
the Commerce Clause hook, commercial actors are 
the regulated entities, and the FTC is the logical 
enforcement authority. The draft CPBRA would 
bolster the vertical separation of powers by exclud-
ing non-commercial individuals and small, therefore 
more likely intra-state, commercial actors from the 
scope of regulated entities. The definition of person-
ally identifying information in the draft act similarly 
maintains focus on the commercial context.
It is unrealistic for Europe to expect that federal 
data protection in the United States would reach 
beyond the scope of interstate commerce. If not 
uniformly, the states have demonstrated a willing-
ness to legislate data protection even more vigorously 
than the federal government. Massachusetts136 and 
California137 have advanced systems. State experi-
ments in time may percolate to become a more 
comprehensive federal regulation of commerce. It is 
moreover disingenuous for Europe to feign ignorance 
of, or purport disdain for, the federalist competence 
spheres in the United States. Europe itself is a quasi-
federal system with spheres of competence articulated 
in the TFEU.138 In fact, customs, market competition, 
monetary policy, and foreign commerce are set out as 
areas of exclusive federal competence.139 So Europe 
well understands the theory of federalism expressed 
through the Commerce Clause.
At the same time, the United States should 
look more carefully at the civil rights implications 
of inadequate data protection. Galvanized by the 
war on terror, federal law enforcement and even 
military authorities have been eager to beef up the 
capacities of state and local law enforcement with 
respect to both brute-force gear and technological 
gadgetry. Little thought has been given to the impli-
cations for civil liberties, whether with respect to 
individuals’ physical safety or with respect to per-
sonal dignity. The Snowden revelations and recent 
cases of high technology surveillance by local law 
enforcement from thermal imaging140 to GPS141 to 
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tower dumps and stingrays142 are a wake-up call. 
Recent media attention to police conduct from the 
killing in Ferguson, Missouri, to the apparent abuse 
of a University of Virginia student, in the news at 
the time of this writing143 point to the dangers of an 
over-empowered public sector and disparately adverse 
impact on disadvantaged persons, if not outright 
discrimination.
In Europe, data protection is working against 
the tendency of government in the age of terrorism 
to erect a surveillance state in the name of public 
security. The relative isolation and sheer size of the 
United States have tended to forestall the problem of 
the surveillance state, 9/11 notwithstanding. But the 
US federal government should be prepared to exer-
cise its power under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
protect civil rights, recognizing that appropriate data 
management in both public and private sectors is part 
of that picture. Negotiation over data transfer is an 
opportunity, again, to learn from comparativism, and 
to inspire the federal government to lead the states, 
rather than trailing behind.
US CONTRACT/PROPERTY PARADIGM 
VERSUS EU RIGHTS PARADIGM
As explained above, the dominating ethic of 
personal responsibility in the cultural tradition of US 
law and policy tends to frame privacy in a paradigm 
of contract and property. In this paradigm, individuals 
act affirmatively, to bargain for and protect their own 
interests. The role of government is to stay out of the 
way, and the role of law is to make sure that it does. If 
there is a place for law, it is as a corrective, or reme-
diation, when agreements are broken. Accordingly, 
personal information is a commodity, and personal 
data may be sold, licensed, or given away. At the same 
time, it is extremely difficult to remove and develop 
data protection, as a subspecies of privacy, from the 
contract/property paradigm by constitutionalizing it 
as a fundamental right. Constitutional jurisprudence 
is text-based and interpretive, so fundamental rights 
tend to be defined statically.
In contrast, the dominating ethic of social respon-
sibility in the cultural tradition of law and policy in 
post-World War II Europe tends to frame privacy in a 
paradigm of human rights. In this paradigm, individu-
als are entitled passively to some protection of their 
interests by the state and by their fellow citizens. The 
role of government is to act affirmatively to ensure 
the realization of human rights, and the role of law 
is to give effect to rights in everyday life. Law acts 
as a distributive, or allocative, force, organizing the 
resources of society to maximize each individual’s 
potential. Accordingly, personal information is an 
expression of identity, and personal data may be 
shared, but remains an aspect of personhood, under 
the control of the originator. Data protection is 
recognized as a fundamental right, a subspecies of pri-
vacy, in the constituting instruments of the European 
Union. Constitutional jurisprudence is interpretive, 
but adaptive and evolving, so fundamental rights may 
grow dynamically.
The most evident manifestation of this disparity 
in approach to data protection is in each continent’s 
permissiveness of an individual’s control over down-
stream use and transfer of personal information. In 
the United States, downstream control is a nearly 
foreign concept, as unlikely as a former homeowner 
returning to the home to object to the new owner’s 
décor. Personal data are an alienable commodity. 
In the European Union, however, an individual’s 
surrender of personal information for unrestrained 
downstream use is no more legally permissible than 
surrendering one’s liberty to involuntary servitude. 
Personal data are integral to individual identity and 
cannot be alienated.
This disparity is perhaps the most toxic in trans-
Atlantic negotiation, because it derives from the 
very identity of each culture. To American eyes, the 
European system seems the pandering of a nanny state 
determined to interject behemoth government into 
every human interaction to ensure that no sloth goes 
unrewarded, that no human endeavor goes unpun-
ished, and that mankind’s natural Darwinist drive to 
improve the human condition through productive 
achievement is utterly derailed. To European eyes, the 
US system seems a hopeless cult of delusional majori-
tarianists held unwitting captive to the almighty 
dollar and possessed of an inexplicably messianic 
conviction that all the world’s people will be better 
off once recruited into zombie servitude to corporate 
overlords.
This is a gap not easily bridged. With blunt cud-
gel of human rights, Europe will only reinforce the 
worst of US anxieties. Rather, I propose that the start 
of an answer lies in the Fourth Amendment itself. 
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If the minimal standard of tolerable intrusion into 
a person’s life is guided by reasonableness—whether 
the reasonable expectation of the individual, or the 
reasonable suspicion of the state—perhaps it is that 
same standard that can help Americans find their way 
to a new norm of privacy.
Critics of the Fourth Amendment standard aptly 
assert that the problem with reasonableness is its 
malleability downward, that is, to a lowest common 
denominator of tolerable conduct. But there is no 
reason that reasonableness always must evolve down-
wardly. In tort law, reasonableness, as the keystone 
of breach in negligence, has been well known to 
evolve upwardly. Conduct that was once regarded as 
comfortably within the purview of the “reasonable 
man”—who in the 1920s apparently “[got] out of his 
car at every railroad crossing to check for oncoming 
trains”144—is now regarded as unexpected of the “rea-
sonable person,” whose very name has adapted to new 
norms.145 Is the beauty of the Fourth Amendment not 
in the word “unreasonable”?146
The same concept might unlock a new future 
for data protection in the private sector. The pres-
ently recent movement to piggyback negligence for 
data protection offenses on sectoral privacy statutes 
with no private cause of action is indicative of the 
capacity of the common law to evolve and recog-
nize civil wrongs in unprecedented circumstances. 
Reasonableness lies at the heart of general negli-
gence, and negligence per se permits, in most jurisdic-
tions, the substitution of the statutory violation. In 
an alternative formulation of negligence per se, the 
statutory violation is at least admissible as persuasive 
evidence for the finder of fact on the core ques-
tion of breach. Either way, the common law seems 
to have detected a sensible connection between 
expectation in data protection law and standards of 
reasonable conduct. In the same vein, 2014 saw the 
adoption of a new common law tort in UK courts: 
the misuse of private information.147 Seeming to lie 
somewhere between conventional negligence and 
breach of confidential duty,148 the nascent creature is 
still taking shape. Just as the negligence theory in the 
United States, the new British tort drew breath from 
breach of data protection standards149—despite the 
Brits’ famous hostility to aggressive federalism in the 
European data protection system.150
Even in the contract/property paradigm, tort 
law and civil rights play referee in private and public 
sector respectively. The duplication of tort norms in 
civil rights, where private causes of action cannot 
be denied upon a failure of legislative authorization, 
demonstrates the common role. Tort steps in to 
maintain a normative floor of social behavior where 
contract and property law fail, as when a contract 
or property transfer is procured by fraud, or a place 
of employment is not maintained to a reasonable 
standard of safety. The civil rights action provides the 
same floor where the defendant acts under color of 
law and violates a constitutional norm.151
It is premature for Europe to expect private 
judicial redress for victims of data protection in the 
United States, for any plaintiff, much less a European 
plaintiff. But given a little more time, the patchwork 
of US sectoral law, including the common law, might 
get there itself. Forty-seven states have adopted data 
breach notification laws, 14 with a private cause of 
action.
Lest there be any doubt that our tort friend 
reasonableness is up to the job of data protection, 
“reasonable” or “reasonably” appears 47 times in the 
CPBRA.
CONCLUSION
The EU and US data protection systems dif-
fer in important ways. The EU system is omnibus, 
or comprehensive, and derives from the social-
democratic tradition of European governance. The 
US system is sectoral and accords with the libertar-
ian tradition in US law and policy. For more than 
a decade, these systems have co-existed with open 
channels for data transfer under the Safe Harbor 
Agreement and related model contractual clauses 
and binding corporate rules. Now those open chan-
nels are threatened in a safe harbor renegotiation 
necessitated by rapidly advancing technology, evolv-
ing social norms, and a legal system trying to keep up 
with those changes.
The cultural gulf in privacy law and policy 
between the United States and Europe will not be 
bridged by a data protection agreement. In the long 
term, the United States and Europe might move 
naturally into harmonization. But in the short term, a 
continuing accommodation is required, lest the con-
tinents’ differences impede technological, social, and 
economic growth. To advance this understanding, 
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this article highlighted three salient differences 
between the US and EU law and policy.
First, the US state action doctrine drives a US 
data protection system to be different from the EU 
system, in which public and private sectors merge as 
regulated entities. In this respect, Europe will have to 
accept the public-private distinction in the United 
States and embrace the dichotomy of negotiating 
partners. In turn, the United States must be willing 
to examine seriously, and to consider remediating, 
the shortcomings of the Privacy Act and the Fourth 
Amendment as regulations of public sector data 
protection, just important as regulation of the com-
mercial sector.
Second, US dual sovereignty drives an approach 
to data protection different from the confederal 
approach of the EU Data Protection Directive and 
Proposed General Data Protection Regulation. It is 
unrealistic at present for Europe to expect that fed-
eral data protection in the United States will reach 
beyond the scope of interstate commerce. But if 
afforded breathing room, the US states will in time 
develop more advanced models for data protection. 
In turn, the United States must be willing to consider 
the civil rights implications of inadequate data pro-
tection in private and public sector, and to consider 
how federal power may be used appropriately to avert 
the construction of a surveillance state.
Third, the contract/property paradigm controls 
the legal character of personal data in the United 
States, while in Europe, a rights paradigm prevails. 
These paradigms drive very different data protection 
systems that arouse impassioned defenders on each 
side. While this cultural gap will not be bridged eas-
ily or quickly, convergence over time is likely. Europe 
is unlikely now to secure private legal redress for EU 
citizens in the next iteration of safe harbor. But recent 
developments in US law suggest that experimentation 
with data protection statutes and tort law will move 
the United States toward a more dynamic understand-
ing of privacy. Corrective remedies for American and 
Europeans alike might lie just over the horizon.
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